

AD-A149 440

DIRECT DEPLOYING UNITS: A CONCEPT REVISITED(U) ARMY WAR 1/1
COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA T D MULCAHY 10 MAY 84

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 15/5


NL



END

FILMED

ETC



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

AD-A149 440

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

2

STUDY PROJECT

DIRECT DEPLOYING UNITS:
A CONCEPT REVISITED

BY

COLONEL TERRENCE D. MULCAHY
INFANTRY

DTIC
ELECTE
JAN 22 1985
S D A

DIG FILE COPY

10 May 1984



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.

85 01 14 083

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
AD A149448		
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Direct Deploying Units: A Concept Revisited		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED STUDENT PAPER
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) COL Terrence D. Mulcahy		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Center for Land Warfare, USAWC Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		12. REPORT DATE May 1984
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 23
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) None		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This is an analysis of the methods of mobilizing Reserve Component units with an emphasis on the role of the direct deploying unit concept. The study examines the current status of the Army Mobilization and Operation Planning System (AMOPS) and FORSCOM's mobilization implementing guidance in FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS). The study suggests that current systems are adequate but plans do not continued		

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

Item 20 - continued.

take advantage of mixing the three mobilization methods; mobilize through mobilization station (men and equipment), modified direct deployment (men through MS and equipment direct through port of embarkation), to maximize mobilization assets in meeting required schedules. The study concludes that more use of the direct deployment concept should be applied to early deploying combat service support units and/or other small specialized units such as medical, AG or JAG units as a means of reducing the pressures on mobstations and aiding our ability to meet required deployment schedules. The study emphasizes a need to preplan mobilization actions and to task STARCs and MUSARCs with specific direct deployment support missions.

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

DIRECT DEPLOYING UNITS:
A CONCEPT REVISITED

INDIVIDUAL STUDY

by

Colonel Terrence D. Mulcahy
Infantry

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
10 May 1984

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR(S): Terrence D. Mulcahy, COL, INF

TITLE: Direct Deploying Units: A Concept Revisited

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 28 April 1984 **PAGES:** 20 **CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

This is an analysis of the methods of mobilizing Reserve Component units with an emphasis on the role of the direct deploying unit concept. The study examines the current status of the Army Mobilization and Operation Planning System (AMOPS) and FORSCOM's mobilization implementing guidance in FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS). The study suggests that current systems are adequate but plans do not take advantage of mixing the three mobilization methods; mobilize through mobilization station (men and equipment), modified direct deployment (men through MS and equipment direct through port of embarkation), to maximize mobilization assets in meeting required schedules. The study concludes that more use of the direct deployment concept should be applied to early deploying combat service support units and/or other small specialized units such as medical, AG or JAG units as a means of reducing the pressures on mobstations and aiding our ability to meet required deployment schedules. The study emphasizes a need to preplan mobilization actions and to task STARCs and MUSARCs with specific direct deployment support missions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT.	ii
INTRODUCTION.	1
HISTORY	4
CURRENT MOBILIZATION PLANS.	7
MOBILIZATION METHODS.	12
CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS	17
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	20

Accession No.	
NTIS	
DTIC TAB	
Unannounced	
Justification	
By	
Dissemination	
Availability Co	
Dist	
A1	
<div> <div>0710</div> <div>COPY</div> <div>INSPECTED</div> </div>	

DIRECT DEPLOYING UNITS--A CONCEPT REVISITED

INTRODUCTION

General Glenn Otis in a 1981 article prepared about mobilization when he was the Department of Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans stated the following:

The concept of moving [reserve component units] directly from home stations to a port of embarkation has been tested and evaluated notably in National Guard Bureau-sponsored exercises. While many complex issues are still being evaluated, this method of deployment is the direction, particularly for the early deploying reserve units.

As of January 1984 one reserve component unit, of the more than 2800 potential units has been officially designated as a direct deploying unit. This apparent lag in policy implementation warrants further study of its validity as a valid deployment concept given the dynamic nature of mobilization planning since the concept's inception during "Nifty Nugget," the JCS directed MOBEX of 1978.

This study will reexamine the nature of mobilizing the Reserve Component in the context of current plans of Department of the Army and Forces Command. An important aspect of mobilization is the understanding that Forces Command (FORSCOM) is the Army's prime mobilizer.

Toward this study objective we shall begin with a look at the seemingly ever increasing importance placed upon the Reserve Component's role in the total force. This role in large part is being driven by the unified/specified commands threat analysis and a congressional desire to hold the line on active force increases. This increased reliance on the Reserve Components emphasizes the importance of mobilization planning

and posturing, especially when one appreciates the fact that all major contingency plans involve some degree of Reserve Component mobilization. This mobilization ranges from selected volunteers, as in the case of Grenada, to the President's 100,000 call up authority, to the one million more partial mobilization, to full mobilization and ultimately total mobilization aimed at deterring or overcoming threats to this nation's security stretching from domestic emergency to full-scale aggression by an external force.

Since 1976 special attention by Joint Chiefs of Staff directed mobilization exercises has focused on mobilization preparedness. These exercises, referred to as MOBEXs, have become biennial events. Each has been designed to highlight potential problems and offer solutions. Subsequent mobilization exercises have tended to check the success of applied corrections and examine other areas. In addition to the JCS-directed exercise objectives, each service attempts to flush out its specific concerns--especially the Army given the scale of the effort it must undergo in mobilization.

Mobilization exercises have provided an excellent way of focusing attention on mobilization problems and providing the needed catalyst to obtain timely solutions. An example of one such problem or issue that surfaced in 1978 during "Nifty Nugget" (MOBEX 78) was the early deployment requirement of numerous RC units in order to satisfy the necessary schedule of the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) for the European contingency war plan. Subsequent MOBEX's continue to find early deployment as an issue for not only the European plans but other worldwide contingency war plans as well. A partial solution suggested in this early MOBEX was the concept of direct deploying--the topic of this study.

As early as 1978 Army regulations² addressed direct deploying as a potential assistance to speed up the deployment of mission essential forces, but short of that, very little other action was initiated to bring this concept to volition. The examination of this issue did result in more attention to the possible ways of mobilizing Reserve Component (RC) units. These methods boiled down to a choice of whether a RC unit goes to its port of embarkation or theater of operations through a mobilization station or direct from its home station reserve center or National Guard armory. The factors behind this choice are the focus of this study.

To appreciate the complexity of this issue in its proper perspective, a review of the current mobilization planning system at Department of the Army level, the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS), and FORSCOMs implementing guidance contained in the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) is necessary and can be found under the topic heading "Current Mobilization Plans." This review of the planning process, the complexity of the pre- and post-mobilization command structure and the special interest of the National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve complete the background data needed to analyze mobilizing methods.

The dynamics of mobilization planning over the past decade has often times out paced our ability to inform and educate the Army planner and his leadership of todays plan implications. Direct deploying is one of those areas where understanding the problem and working the current system can reap a fruitful harvest.

It will be the objective of this study to identify the status of the direct deploying concept, point out the practicality of its continued application and suggest some enhancements.

With this as a backdrop, let us review some relevant history.

HISTORY

Reserve Component Forces

In 1973 conscription ended and the United States became totally dependent on a volunteer military force. During this same year Secretary of Defense Schlesinger announced the Total Force Policy acknowledging the importance of the Guard and the Reserves to the Total Force, ". . . [National Guard and Reserve] forces are no longer regarded simply as forces in reserve."³

Since 1973 each year has seen increased roles and responsibilities going to the Reserve Component so that by the close of Fiscal Year 1983 the following picture existed.

<u>% Total Force</u>	<u>Mission</u>
33	Combat Divisions
50	Artillery Battalions
60	Armored Cavalry Regiments
46	Medical Units
33	Combat Service Support
50	Combat Units
67	Non-division Combat Forces
82	Separate Brigade Combat Forces
67	Total Army's Tactical Support Force
34	Special Theater and General Support Force

Army Guard and Reserve Missions⁴

To further illustrate the importance of the Guard (NG) and Reserves (USAR), today's Army National Guard provide 30% of the Army's entire organized structure, about 46% of its combat elements and 37% of its support forces.⁵ The USAR on the other hand provides about 70% of the combat support and combat service support units in the Army force structure. In terms of manpower, the Guard totals over 400,000 men and women in some 3400 company and detachment sized units in 2600 different communities.

The USAR totals over 220,000 men and women in 3200 company and detachment sized units and some 200,000 women and men in the individual ready reserve.⁶

In addition, reserve component units are no longer viewed as follow-on forces. Many RC units are needed before various active units in executing many contingency war plans such as those to support NATO or Southwest Asia. These critical RC units are being directed to plan for mobilization and deployment to their assigned theaters within 10 days or earlier of mobilization.

About thirty percent of the Rapid Deployment Force initially was RC units and plan updates may increase this role. As mentioned, our commitment to NATO places heavy reliance upon RC forces early in the execution of any war plan option. This need for early RC deployment is true in all of our major contingency war plans. One only needs to look at the Grenada rescue to see how important RC talents are to the defense of this nation. However, unlike the Grenada rescue, execution of a major global contingency plan requires the rapid and timely mobilization of RC units.

Mobilization Exercises

Beginning in 1976, Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff-directed efforts in the form of mobilization exercises (MOBEX) were initiated to test our readiness to meet that challenge. Because of the scope of its mobilization responsibility the Army was and continues to be a leader in supporting and carrying out mobilization exercises that have become a biennial event.

After action reports of MOBEX-76 indicated that mobilization guidance was cumbersome and confusing—as many as 200 documents and regulations were required for a RC unit; policies regarding many aspects of

mobilization were vague or missing; serious disconnects existed between European war plans and CONUS mobilization plans; command and control problems; ADP shortfall and mobilization station inadequacy to support planning and logistics of mobilization; excessive requirements for overseas preparation and movement.⁷ The results of this exercise opened the eyes of many defense leaders and actions were directed to make the process more viable. Toward this end it was decided to continue to emphasize centralized planning with a clear-cut decentralized command and control structure for mobilization and deployment. This exercise and subsequent ones such as Nifty Nugget (MOBEX 78) and Proud Spirit (MOBEX 80) have greatly assisted in developing and testing the Army's Mobilization and Operation Planning System, AMOPS, which will be described later along with the implementing instructions by Forces Command titled FORMDEPS--FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System.

Two issues germane to this study that surfaced early and continue as persistent problems are early deployment requirements and mobilization station shortfalls. MOBEXs in 1978 and 1980 each suggested the use of direct deployment as one way to help solve these issues.

Capstone Program

Through the initiatives of General Shoemaker when he was the FORSCOM commander, the Capstone program was born. This program provides a wartime mission for all CONUS units--Reserve Component and Active forces. The program is driven by the various unified/specified command requirements, most notably Europe, provides RC unit a realistic training objective and also provides the necessary connector to help plan a realistic mobilization schedule based upon an employment mission and a required arrival date in a theater.

CURRENT MOBILIZATION PLANS

Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS)

Through the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System, all components of the Army plan and execute action to provide and expand Army forces and resources to meet the requirements of unified commands. AMOPS serves as the Army Supplement to the Joint Operation Planning System. It provides the interface between unified/specified command plans, plans for deployment and utilization of forces and Army plans for providing mobilized forces and resources.⁸

In this context of mobilizing and deploying forces the Capstone program becomes the welding force that allows for timely and orderly planning by giving real world wartime mission(s) to the USAR and Guard that can be exercised throughout the system, i.e., allows for the testing of mobilization. Also, it provides the opportunity to validate employment plans and effect coordination in the theater of operation in a meaningful way.

Specifically, AMOPS is defined in a set of documents that are summarized in Figure 1 (See next page).

Thus AMOPS specifies the planning process used to develop HQDA and MACOM mobilization plans. Key to this system is the role of FORSCOM--the Army's prime mobilizer within the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System. To accomplish this role the FORSCOM mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) was developed to supplement AMOPS.

DOCUMENT	PURPOSE	SCOPE
AR 600-5 AMOPS I SYSTEM DESCRIPTION, RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES	ESTABLISHES AMOPS DEFINES SYSTEM FOR: 1. ARMY MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION 2. ARMY PARTICIPATION IN THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CONSOLIDATES POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND DEFINES RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ARMY MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION AND FOR ARMY PARTICIPATION IN JOINT OPERATION PLANNING & EXECUTION • DEFINES MOBILIZATION PLANNING AS APPLYING TO ALL PLANS FOR RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ACTIVE FORCE UNDER SELECTIVE, PARTIAL, FULL AND TOTAL MOBILIZATION, AND PLANS OF HQDA, MACOMS, INTERMEDIATE HQ, INSTALLATIONS AND AC/RC UNITS • DEFINES OPERATIONS PLANNING AS APPLYING TO ALL JOINT AND SUPPORTING ARMY PLANS FOR CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES TO THEATER
AMOPS II STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES	PROVIDES MOBILIZATION AND OPERATIONS PLANNING GUIDANCE PERTAINING TO AVAILABILITY, ALLOCATION, AND EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES	APPLIES TO: 1. CBT, CS, CSS & GSF UNITS 2. DEPLOYABLE & NONDEPLOYABLE UNITS 3. ALL COMPONENTS
AMOPS III ARMY MOBILIZATION & DEPLOYMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE	PROVIDES ARMY AGENCIES, COMMANDS, AND COMPONENTS OF UNIFIED COMMANDS GUIDANCE REQUIRED TO PLAN FOR MOBILIZATION & DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES	CONTAINS ADMINISTRATIVE, OPERATIONAL, AND PLANNING GUIDANCE. APPLIES TO ALL COMPONENTS.
AMOPS IV ARMY CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM	DESCRIBES ARMY CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM, RELATIONSHIP TO JCS CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM, PRESCRIBES HQDA CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION & STAFFING METHODS	DESCRIBES STREAMLINED STAFF ORGANIZATIONS OF JCS & ARMY, ARMY CRISIS STAFFING METHODS, MOBILIZATION DECISION SUPPORT PROCESS, ALTERNATE COMMAND CENTER OPERATIONS, PRE-POSITIONED AUTHORITIES FOR MACOM USE, RELATIONSHIP TO EMERGENCY ACTION PROCEDURES
AMP ARMY MOBILIZATION PLAN	ESTABLISHES PROCEDURES FOR MOBILIZATION EXECUTION WITHIN HQDA & EACH MACOM	IS COMPRISED OF THE COLLECTED MOBILIZATION PLANS OF HQDA AND THE MACOMS

Figure 1

FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System⁹

FORMDEPS establishes the planning system to be used in the development, review, and distribution of the FORSCOM Mobilization Plan (FMP), subordinate unit and installation mobilization plans, and the Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan (MTBSP).

The specific objective of FORMDEPS is to provide a consolidated set of documents which detail mobilization and deployment planning guidance and instructions to other MACOMs, CONUSAs, installations and to appropriate Reserve Component headquarters.

FORMDEPS covers, in five volumes, the following:

1. Mobilization and deployment relationships of FORSCOM with unified/specified commands, DA, NGB, MACOMs and subordinate units.
2. Consolidates procedures, requirements and defines responsibilities for accomplishment of mobilization and deployment planning and execution.
3. Systems which FORSCOM uses to support mobilization and deployment.

The five FORMDEPS volumes are:

Volume I. System description.

Volume II. HQ FORSCOM Wartime Plan (Internal plan for operation of FORSCOM HQ).

Volume III. Mobilization Planning (four parts).

Part 1. FORSCOM Mobilization Plan (FMP)--narrative guidance for mobilization of RC elements.

Part 2. Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan (MTBSP)--a computerized output of the plan.

Part 3. RC Unit Commanders Handbook.

Part 4. Total Mobilization.

Volume IV. Installation Commander's Guide.

Volume V. Deployment Guidance.

The fallout of AMOPS and FORMDEPS is a centralized planning system that allows for decentralized execution. Early in the review of this system, the FORSCOM role as the Army's prime mobilizer becomes clear. Thus an understanding of the key FORSCOM assets/structure is important.

Mobilization Command and Control Structure

As noted, FORSCOM is the principal Army mobilizer of RC elements. To accomplish this task the key actors become the CONUSAs, STARCs and MUSARCs, Mobilization Stations (MS) and RC units.

CONUSAs are responsible for the entire "Go to war" effort, for FORSCOM missions within boundaries.

Mobilization is decentralized to successive levels of command, with all headquarters (CONUSA, Installations and STARC and MUSARC) and RC units executing preplanned actions.

RC units mobilize in accordance with the Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan or instructions in the alert/mobilization order. RC unit commanders initiate actions to prepare unit for active duty, movement and post-mobilization training and/or employment.

CONUSAs will manage by exception the activities of installations, STARC and MUSARC.

STARC and MUSARC will assist RC units at Home Station (HS), move units to Mobilization Station (MS or POE), and manage the disposition of residual personnel equipment and property.

MS commanders will receive, fill, support and direct activities of incoming RC units to optimize the number of units operationally ready

to meet deployment schedules. This includes validation of RC units for deployment.

The normal command trace for a RC unit commander executing mobilization plans will start with his peacetime command structure (MUSARC/ARCOM for USAR units and State Guard structure for Guard units) during the alert and assembly at his home station. At home station through movement to MS or POE he will fall under either a federalized STARC or MUSARC. For RC units moving to a mobstation control will pass to the MS commander upon arrival at the station. The MS commander is responsible for the redistribution of personnel and equipment to meet deployment schedules. His authority for this regarding FORSCOM assets is more or less autonomous. FORSCOM has also tasked MS/installations with the responsibility of deploying direct deploying units--a task which strikes at the heart of some of the basic problems surrounding Direct Deploying.

The above discussion was not intended to be a complete coverage of the command and control structure for mobilizing forces. It was rather an attempt to focus on the multiple command layers that a RC commander will quickly pass through during mobilization, highlight the importance of the MS and identify available command assets which can impart direct deployment.

An examination of the process quickly reveals that the mobilization planning system is structured around preplanned activities surrounded by a support system:

- STARC/MUSARC during HS and movement (MS and POE).
- MS during operational readiness activities.
- CONUSA on an exception basis throughout.

Mobilization Station/Installation

Today the more than 50 installations nationwide that have been designated Mobilization Stations form the backbone to the success of any mobilization. These stations provide the central points where units can be trained, filled with equipment and men, validated and shipped to POEs. But is it reasonable or practical to process all units through these sites?

Many in the mobilization business will argue long and hard that cross leveling personnel, redistribution of equipment and validation requirements stacked against an austere staffed MS community necessitate that most RC units deploy through a MS.

On the other hand, problems such as limited deployment time, unnecessary travel in some cases and inadequate housing provisions at MS raise questions about the need to process through a MS. This does not mean that support from an installation/MS is not needed, but rather how it will be provided. However, before looking further at this issue, let us define the methods available for mobilizing RC units.

MOBILIZATION METHODS

Home Station to Mobilization Station (HS-MS)

This is the most common of the methods available for mobilization. It involves moving a RC unit to a designated installation (personnel and equipment) where final preparation for deployment and employment is accomplished.

Direct Deploying Unit Concept (DDU)

FORSCOM has defined this as the deployment of a RC unit directly from home station to an overseas theater. The direct deployment concept applies only to those units deploying totally by air.

Modified Direct Deployment Concept (MDDU)

FORSCOM defines this as the deployment of a RC unit's equipment direct from home station to a sea port of embarkation and the personnel through a Mobilization Station.

Analysis

Under any mobilization scenario satisfying the demands of the first few days may well mean the difference between success and failure. It is this same time when major shifts in direction and command relationships will be required throughout the defense community. Preplanned actions and command lines must be in place and understood within the mobilizing community.

As previously discussed, AMOPS and FORMDEPS provides the system and identifies the command relationships. This system fully recognizes various methods of deploying RC units and provides a framework for predesignating the preferred method on a unit by unit basis. However, when examining current mobilization plans we find almost all mobilization action being handled through the 50 odd MS in CONUS. Is this reasonable? To answer this question we need to review the principal mobilization actions required to bring a RC unit on to active duty and into a port of embarkation at a readiness status where it can accomplish its wartime mission.

The principal actions after mobilization are:

- Administrative processing of unit members.
 - o Personnel screening.
 - o Finance.
 - o Legal.

- Finalizing unit preparation.

- o Personnel.
- o Supply and equipment.
- o Maintenance.
- o Training (as possible).
- o Validation.

- Movement.

- o Loading.
- o Transportation.
- o POE coordination.

- Residual Actions.

- o Control of centers/armory.
- o Control of stay behind personnel and equipment.

The above actions are required under any method of mobilizing. Also, all deploying units will require assistance from their STARC/MUSARC, Mobilization Station/Installation and/or CONUSA. The degree and location of that assistance becomes key to the method-of-mobilization decision.

It is generally agreed that units should mobilize at a MS where training areas, ranges and support facilities are available--where they can be crossleveled with people and equipment. This is especially true for combat units. However, direct deployment can relieve problems to a degree in the early stages of mobilization, when mobstations and transportation networks are overcrowded.

The fallout of these factors is that direct deployers would not be combat units and should be early deployers. It must further be understood that DDU will still require MS support. However, early designation (pre-mobilization) and preplanned actions between the RC unit, its

STARC/MUSARC and supporting installations can greatly facilitate getting the necessary assistance to the unit in a timely fashion.

Another factor to be considered before designating a unit a DDU is whether it is completely air transportable. The present FORSCOM definition for DDU requires that the unit be air transportable.

Upon close examination it seems reasonable to conclude that DDU should have the following general characteristics.

- RC unit should have an early deployment date (say D+15 or less).
- Light, easily deployable (air transportable) with little or no post mobilization training and be maintained in a high readiness posture.
- Special type units that have equipment that is difficult to move over land but can be air moved e.g., heavy boat companies.
- POMCUS units if,
 - o Shortfall is air transportable.
 - o PURE is located at or moved to MS for redistribution.

Examples of these type units are TAACOM/COSCOM HQ, combat service support HQ and companies, medical command and control units, selected medical detachments and JAG units.

Regarding modified direct deployment unit designation the criteria is similar to DDU in that it should be an early deployer. However, by definition this mobilization method is two part where equipment goes direct from HS to seaport and manpower through a MS to a POE. A key factor is early equipment load dates and/or movement by the unit's SPOE enroute to their MS.

All other units should go through a mobstation where installation support can best handle:

- SIDPERS data validation.
- JUMPS conversion.
- Personnel crossleveling.
- Equipment redistribution.
- Unit validation.
- Providing basic load of Classes I, V, VIII, and IX.

For DDU and Modified DDU detailed planning before mobilization must be accomplished between the RC unit, STARC/MUSARC and supporting installations. A POMCUS approach to configuring unit equipment at or near a POE could greatly assist early deployment for DDUs. Prepositioning organization equipment for DDU and/or Modified DDUs at the unit's training center/armory or port of embarkation would significantly reduce deployment preparation. To avoid drawing and maintaining a duplicate set of equipment for training, the prepositioning approach could be modified to exclude mission essential training equipment and/or a system be developed where a unit would maintain its equipment in a partial shipping configuration where equipment is taken out and placed back as dictated by training requirements. Designating MUSARC/STARC mobilization assistance teams from current assets or possibly tasking late deployers through a mobstation with the responsibility of support. Current plans call for the early mobilization of selected late deploying units as "Quick Fix" assets at a mobstation. This "Quick Fix" concept could be expanded by earmarking portions of late deploying RC units as DDU support teams that would function through the STARCs or MUSARCs. STARCs and MUSARCs must obtain access to ADP systems in order to upload into SIDPERS, DEMSTAT

(Deployment Employment and Mobilization Status System) and CAMIS (Continental Army Management Information System).

Status

Current FORSCOM mobilization instruction allow CONUSAs reasonable flexibility and direction. At present all RC units except one unit (412 Engr Command HHD) as direct deploying and 10 units (464 Med Boat Co., 1118 Med Boat Co., 824 Hv Boat Co., 231 Med Boat Co., 481 Hv Boat Co., 949 Floating Craft Co., 158 LARC LX Co., 292 LARC LX Co.,) as modified direct deploying, mobilize through a designated mobstation.

FORSCOM continues to encourage the field to screen and nominate RC units for direct and modified direct deploying units.

Notwithstanding the problems associated with direct deployment, FORSCOM supports such deployment when it is in the best interest of the Army. FORSCOM has requested CONUSAs establish procedures to ensure continuing consideration of RC units for direct/modified direct deployment.¹⁰

Upon receipt of nominations, FORSCOM reviews these units with the National Guard Bureau of the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve for concurrence/nonconcurrence and decides on whether or not to so designate the unit.

CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

Current mobilization systems provide an excellent framework for developing mobilization plans. This conclusion is supported by the results of Exercise Proud Saber (Mobex 82).¹¹ Mobilization plans are dynamic in response to unified/specified command requirements. The mobilizing community needs to expand its consideration of mobilizing methods to more realistically incorporate all three methods: Mobstation; Direct Deployment; and Modified Direct Deployment.

Direct and Modified Direct Deployment will cause special support problems. The primary problem will be the need to bring the support to the unit rather than the unit to the support site. These problems can be corrected by pre-designating support teams from MUSARC/STARC assets, installations and/or late deployers, i.e. identify and designate portions of "Quick Fix" units to support direct deploying or modified direct deploying units.

POMCUS at unit locations or POE would greatly reduce preparation time and should be given serious consideration.

In any case, the key to successful mobilization rests with pre-planned actions that are managed and exercised at each level of command to ensure that the most realistic coordinated effort is being applied. Mobilization like the night attack depends on detailed plans that are rehearsed and rehearsed.

ENDNOTES

1. Glenn K. Otis, GEN, "Keeping Mobilization on the Front Burner," Army Magazine, October 1981, p. 154.
2. US Department of Army, Army Regulation AR 135-300, Chapter 10, Direct Deployment or Employment of Reserve Component Units. Washington: 15 May 1978, (Rescinded 15 September 1981).
3. US Department of Defense, Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, Washington: 1982 (Working draft), p. 4.
4. Ibid., p. 6.
5. Ibid., p. 24.
6. Ibid., p. 31.
7. US Army Forces Command, Final Evaluation Report--Mobilization Command Post Exercise MOBEX-76 (C), Fort McPherson, GA, 30 April 1977, pp. 2-10.
8. US Department of Army, Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (U), Volume I, "System Description, Responsibility and Procedures," March 1984, pp. 1-2.
9. US Department of Army, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), Fort McPherson, GA, Volumes I thru V.
10. US Army Forces Command, Fact Sheet--RC Unit Direct Deployment Policy, DCSOPS/Plans Division, 13 April 1984.
11. US Department of Army, Exercise Proud Saber, Army Exercise Analysis Report (S), Volume I--Main Report (U), Washington: 3 June 1983, p. I-9.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Otis, Glenn K., General. "Keeping Mobilization on the Front Burner."
Army Magazine. October 1981.
- US Army Forces Command. Final Evaluation Report. "Mobilization Command
Post Exercise MOBEX-76 (C). Fort McPherson, GA. 30 April 1977.
- US Army Forces Command. Fact Sheet--RC Unit Direct Deployment Policy.
DCSCOPS/Plans Division. 13 April 1984.
- US Department of Army. Army Regulation AR 135-300. Washington D.C.:
15 May 1978. (Rescinded 15 September 1981)
- US Department of Army. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (U).
Volume I. Washington D.C.: March 1984.
- US Department of Army. FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System.
Fort McPherson, GA.
- US Department of Army. Exercise Proud Saber. Army Exercise Analysis
Report (S). Volume I--Main Report (U). Washington D.C.: 3 June 1983.
- US Department of Defense. Reserve Components of the United States Armed
Forces. Washington D.C.: 1982 (Working draft).

END

FILMED

2-85

DTIC